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364 
COPYRIGHT’S OTHER FUNCTIONS 
MARGARET CHON* 
INTRODUCTION 
As Judge McKeown carefully explains, copyright provides incentives 
to create works that may have commercial value. As a not unforeseen part of 
the statutory bargain, copyright holders hold a governmentally granted 
means to prevent others from exercising full expression. Speech is primarily 
impacted by copyright when the defendant is proven to have infringed the 
plaintiff’s protected work. In that case, the danger to the expressive freedoms 
of the defendant can be mitigated by copyright safety valves (or policy 
levers)1 such as the scope of protection (narrowed by the idea/expression 
distinction, for instance), applicable defenses (such as fair use), and 
(hopefully) a reasonably limited term of protection. 
This logic is how the tension between copyright and the First 
Amendment is usually resolved. Yet, as Judge McKeown also carefully 
explains, we are beginning to observe a new type of tension that challenges 
this long-observed truce. In this still emerging scenario, speech is impacted 
when copyright holders use their statutory grant as a means to express non-
market-based motivations and to further individual and social goals besides 
creativity. These other motivations and goals are neither necessarily 
personally wrong nor socially irrelevant; however, they fall within the 
penumbra rather than the core of copyright’s policy concerns because they 
do not engage with the commercial instrumentalism broadly underlying our 
intellectual property laws. In Garcia v. Google, Inc., for example, the 
plaintiff’s copyright claim was made to further her interest in personal public 
safety and to distance herself from the content in a protected work with 
which she did not agree, rather than to profit from its revenue stream. Garcia 
clearly did not have a commercial interest in the work; indeed, she was 
interested in making sure that its dissemination, whether commercial or 
 
 *  Donald & Lynda Horowitz Professor for the Pursuit of Justice, Seattle University School of 
Law. I would like to thank Professor Edward Lee for inviting me to respond to Judge McKeown; 
Professors David Skover and Ann Bartow for their feedback on this response; and Natasha Khanna, class 
of 2017, for her able research assistance. 
 1.  See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1575 (2003). 
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otherwise, was curtailed. This desire not to distribute a work, for privacy or 
public safety, or other reasons not related to commercial interests, raises new 
possibilities of censorship in the guise of authorship. 
I refer to these as other concerns or goals as the “other functions” of 
copyright not because they are unimportant or trivial, but because they do 
not seem to align with the dominant commercial rationale for copyright. 
Judge McKeown and other commentators, such as Jeanne Fromer,2 worry 
about the growing reliance by plaintiffs upon these other functions of 
copyright. They discuss Garcia both to draw attention to this trend and to 
express their dissatisfaction with it. Judge McKeown refers to this evolution 
in case law as “[c]opyright as the Go-To Tool,”3 and Fromer finds that, in 
these types of cases, “ill-fitting motivations . . . that are not congruent with 
the commercial instrumental aims of intellectual property and which may 
introduce distortionary effects on intellectual property law as a whole.”4 
While the outcome of Garcia seems inevitable despite a sympathetic 
plaintiff (because to have held otherwise, pragmatically, would have created 
huge hold-up and anti-commons effects in large, collaborative and 
expensive-to-create works such as motion pictures), the technical holding 
regarding ownership of copyright5 should not obscure the larger dilemma it 
raises: How should courts treat the other functions of copyright law? 
The Internet challenges us to understand copyright law as taking a more 
capacious role in overall knowledge governance. Unlike observers such as 
Judge McKeown, or scholars who would prefer that intellectual property be 
organized according to market-based principles,6 the greater danger I see is 
that copyright’s justifiable uses for ends other than pure commercial 
incentive might be overshadowed by copyright formalism. This response 
makes several points in support of viewing some other functions of copyright 
as legitimate responses to the decentralized technical architecture of digital 
networks. The motivations of copyright owners are diverse and are not 
always or purely about commercial gain in the marketplace. This is certainly 
 
 2.  Jeanne C. Fromer, Should the Law Care Why Intellectual Property Rights Have Been Asserted?, 
53 HOUS. L. REV. 549, 556 (2015) (discussing “examples of different motivations for asserting rights, 
including privacy and reputational interests, protection of one’s market beyond the intellectual property 
right, and extraction of rents from third parties without sufficient contribution to the progress underlying 
the granting of the right”). 
 3.  Hon. M. Margaret McKeown, Censorship in the Guise of Authorship: Harmonizing Copyright 
and the First Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2016). 
 4.  Id. (“The law sometimes accounts for these motivations, but at other times it does not”). 
 5.  Cf. Brief for Amici Curiae, Garcia v. Google, Inc., (9th Cir. Dec. 5, 2014) (No. 12-57302), 2014 
WL 7040101. 
 6.  Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement, 112 
MICH. L. REV. 1251 (2014). 
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true lately in the context of the huge amounts of user-generated content in 
digital networks.7 If we limit our understanding of legitimate goals of 
copyright protection to market actors or commercial ends, we are missing a 
lot of the copyright story, past and especially present. And even if the 
primacy of copyright’s commercial instrumentalism is conceded, the actual 
constitutional mandate pertains to “progress of science,” which can also 
(perhaps counterintuitively) include the right not to exploit a work at all—
what could be viewed as a largely unexplored negative right of copyright.8 
Furthermore, and perhaps more to the point, privacy concerns have 
always been a part, albeit a minor aspect, of copyright, and the fair use 
doctrine has largely been the primary doctrinal category under the 1976 Act 
to recognize this concern.9 Supplementing fair use, copyright provides an 
additional policy lever for an unpublished work. As the U.S. Supreme Court 
acknowledged in Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,10 
the right of first publication is historically connected to privacy interests of 
the author, because the work has not yet entered the commercial realm. That 
is, to the extent that we are concerned about impacting free expression 
through recognition of incidental copyright functions—such as claims 
motivated by privacy or safety rather than commercial gain—these concerns 
can be mitigated by the very same copyright policy levers as are applied to 
works made for commercial gain. Copyright may need adjustment in the 
non-commercial context, but non-commercial goals of copyright are fair 
game for doctrinal nuances and evolution. Privacy and other functions of 
copyright should not be categorically excluded as beyond the legitimate 
purview of copyright’s concerns, and copyright will not be stretched beyond 
its breaking point by incorporating them. 
These points are illustrated further here through a case study of a 
growing public policy problem—cyber-harassment through the use of non-
consensual pornography (“NCP”) posted on the Internet, typically but not 
always by ex-partners. This case study is chosen for several different 
reasons. It poses the same equities present in Garcia; both situations involve 
breach of the terms of a private agreement by one party, in consequence of 
which the victim of that breach turns to copyright to assert control over 
 
 7.  See generally Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459 
(2008). 
 8.  Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228–29 (1990); Amanda Levendowski, Using Copyright to 
Combat Revenge Porn, 3 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 422, 442 (2014) (“Revenge porn victims are 
a perfect example of the ways in which negative copyrights incentivize creation: those images would 
never have been shared if victims did not believe they could control who saw them.”). 
 9.  Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F, 2d 90, 94 (2nd Cir. 1987). 
 10.  471 U.S. 539, 554 (1985). 
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distribution of content for compelling reasons. However, unlike the Garcia 
plaintiff, NCP plaintiffs typically do not participate in the creation of content 
for commercial gain or for public consumption. And so while the questions 
of ownership and subsequent control over NCP works may have ripple 
effects on other collaborative works, the fact that they are created largely in 
confidential, non-commercial and/or private contexts is a key distinction that 
can aid courts in surgically targeting these cases within broader copyright 
doctrine. 
Additionally, the NCP cases are different from the other cases described 
by Judge McKeown as part of a “litigation cottage industry” of privacy cases 
involving celebrities, because both parties in NCP cases are typically non-
public figures and the content is typically not newsworthy (except to the 
extent that it is posted online and creates unwanted attention upon the 
plaintiff, thereby creating a collateral and typically unwanted notoriety). 
Thus, NCP cases thus fall within an area where the First Amendment claims 
are relatively weak, and the corresponding privacy claims and ensuing social 
benefits asserted through copyright are strong. 
In short, privacy concerns expressed through copyright are not an 
anomaly and can be addressed, if in limited and targeted fashion, through 
copyright’s current doctrinal framework. Thus copyright doctrine can 
perform the narrow tailoring in response to a defendant’s fundamental right 
of expression, at least in the realm of NCP. 
BALANCING COPYRIGHT’S OTHER FUNCTIONS AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: A CASE STUDY OF NCP 
A proverbial spate of law review articles and books has recently 
highlighted the issue of what is colloquially dubbed “revenge porn.”11 In this 
response, the term “non-consensual pornography” is chosen as an umbrella 
term to highlight the harms inflicted. As a recent observer states: the 
typical revenge porn scenario . . . includes an image captured or obtained 
consensually, two intimate partners, a break-up, and a revenge post of the 
image. But this is not the only scenario in which the non-consensual 
distribution of sexually explicit images occurs. Sometimes, friends, 
classmates, or co-workers of an individual obtain and distribute such 
images. Or friends, exes, or strangers hack into individuals’ computers to 
acquire images to distribute later. And in some instances, the distributors 
capture and post images without the individuals’ knowledge or 
 
 11.  See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 345, 346 (2014); Ann Bartow, Copyright and Pornography, 91 OR. L. REV. 1, 44–45 
(2012). 
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consent. . . . Although popular media tends to use the term “revenge porn” 
to describe all of the scenarios just mentioned, a more accurate label is 
non-consensual pornography (NCP). NCP, of which revenge porn is a 
subset, includes the distribution of any sexually explicit image of an 
individual without her consent, regardless of how the distributor obtained 
the image and regardless of whether the situation involved an ex. . . . 
[T]herefore, []the term NCP [may be used] to clarify that the revenge porn 
problem expands beyond vengeful ex-lovers.12 
The problem of NCP is no mere moral panic. According to one estimate, 
this type of activity affects up to 850,000 victims each year.13 Federal and 
state criminal lawsuits have begun to address this issue.14 Last year, both 
California and Washington state passed criminal statutes targeting NCP (two 
of a handful of states to do so), and California’s Attorney General Kamala 
Harris recently successfully prosecuted one of the more flagrant purveyors 
of NCP on the Internet.15 Civil suits have also been filed, largely the work of 
pioneering law school clinics and pro bono lawyers.16 
A recent Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) settlement illustrates both 
the problem and the steps now being taken by regulators to target this 
 
 12.  Emily Poole, Fighting Back Against Non-Consensual Pornography, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. 181, 
183–84 (2015). 
 13.  David Bateman & Paula Martersteck, Copyright Law and the Fight Against Revenge Porn: 
Q&A with David Bateman of the Cyber Civil Rights Legal Project (Feb. 19, 2015), 
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/copyright-law-and-the-fight-against-reve-54213/ (stating “[i]f you 
could find a way to fund it, you could have an infinite number of clients. I was at a conference recently 
and they said there an estimated 850,000 victims a year.”). 
 14.  People v. Barber, 2014 NY slip op. 50193(U), 42 Misc. 3d 1225(A), 992 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Crim. 
Ct.); State v. Parsons, No. A-3856-10T3, 2011 WL 6089210 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2011); 
see also Abby Ohlheiser, Revenge Porn Purveyor Hunter Moore is Sentenced to Prison, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2015/12/03/revenge-porn-
purveyor-hunter-moore-is-sentenced-to-prison/. According to various news outlets, Moore purchased 
nude photographs acquired by Charles Evans, a computer hacker who accessed email accounts to acquire 
the photos. Id. Furthermore, the photos identified their subjects by name and sometimes included the 
subjects’ contact or social media information. Id. Moore pleaded guilty to “one count of unauthorized 
access to a protected computer to obtain information for purposes of private financial gain and one count 
of aggravated identity theft.” Id. He was sentenced to two and a half years in federal prison, followed by 
three years of supervised release. 
 15.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.85 (West 2015) (July 1, 2015); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.86.010 (2015) 
(creating the crime of wrongfully distributing intimate images, effective as of Sept. 26, 2015); Danielle 
Citron & Woodrow Hartzog, The Decision That Could Finally Kill the Revenge-Porn Business, THE 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/02/the-decision-that-
could-finally-kill-the-revenge-porn-business/385113/ (“California’s Attorney General Kamala 
Harris is prosecuting revenge-porn businesses exploiting confidential communications for financial 
ends); see also David Wagner, San Diego Man Found Guilty in Revenge Porn Trial, KBPS PUBLIC 
BROADCASTING (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.kpbs.org/news/2015/feb/02/san-diego-man-found-tktktk-
revenge-porn-trial/ (convicting revenge-porn operator Kevin Bollaert on several charges of extortion and 
identity theft.). 
 16.  Patel v. Hussain, No. 14-14-00459-CV, 2016 WL 270014 (Tex. App. Jan. 21, 2016); Matthew 
Goldstein, Law Firm Founds Project to Fight “Revenge Porn”, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2015), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/29/law-firm-founds-project-to-fight-revenge-porn/?_r=0. 
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behavior.17 Filed on December 28, 2015, the FTC complaint alleged that 
Craig Brittain, the owner of www.isanybodydown.com and five other similar 
websites, posted pictures that he had received anonymously through the 
website, violating the FTC Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58). The FTC accused 
Brittain of tricking women into sharing nude photos with him by 
impersonating a woman and vowing to keep the photos confidential; it 
alleged that it was unfair for Brittain to exploit personal information shared 
in confidence for commercial gain. A number of individuals, mainly women, 
claimed that when they saw their images posted on Brittain’s website, 
Brittain refused to comply with requests to take the images down from the 
site.18 Donald S. Clark, the Secretary of the Commission, issued the decision 
which (1) required the websites to obtain consent in writing from individuals 
who appear in videos and photos submitted to the website, (2) restrained and 
enjoined the websites from misrepresenting material facts, (3) required that 
Brittain destroy any materials for which written consent was not obtained, 
and (4) maintain copies of consent forms in a manner which could be 
retrieved and disclosed to the FTC.19 
Danielle Citron and Woodrow Hartzog note that this FTC action is part 
of an emerging wave of successful civil and criminal actions in response to 
breaches of privacy.20 Just as it took time for the legal system to recognize 
sexual harassment in the workplace, Citron has argued that it is now slowly 
but increasingly recognizing that sexual information brought unilaterally 
outside of personal, intimate relationships should be scrutinized.21 The core 
of the harm that has been “overlooked or minimized [is] the confidential 
relationships in which intimate images are shared . . . . Personal information 
is often exchanged in the course of relationships. Those relationships 
engender responsibilities when serious harm results from their breach.”22 
All commentators to date are well aware of the First Amendment issues 
involved in targeting NCP, as well as the inadequacy of existing privacy and 
 
 17.  In re Craig Brittain, FTC Matter 132 3120 (Jan. 8, 2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/132-3120/craig-brittain-matter. 
 18.  In re Craig Brittain, Complaint at 1–2, 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160108craigbrittaincmpt.pdf. 
 19.  In re Craig Brittain, Decision & Order at 2–5, 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160108craigbrittaindo.pdf. 
 20.  Citron & Hartzog, supra note 15 (“Businesses are now on notice that it is illegal to exploit 
information shared in confidence and with an expectation of privacy. Stalking-app providers and revenge-
porn site operators should heed the warning: Repurposing confidential relationships, and the information 
shared in them, for commercial gain could prompt action by consumer-protection agencies.”). 
 21.  DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 96–102 (2014). 
 22.  Citron & Hartzog, supra note 15. 
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criminal protections.23 Some commentators offer legal solutions that they 
suggest are not overly broad restrictions on speech, while still addressing the 
privacy concerns of the victims. For example, one student note argues for an 
amendment to the safe harbor provided by § 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act so that internet service providers (“ISPs”) are stripped of 
immunity if they encourage the posting of illegal or tortious content, or 
contribute materially to illegal or tortious conduct.24 Another offers a model 
criminal statute,25 which addresses gaps around cross-jurisdictional 
enforcement. And several commentators have noted the potential remedies 
provided by copyright law. 
An early scholar examining copyright and pornography, Ann Bartow, 
advocated NCP “copyrights to be recognized and even registered, but then 
to vest ownership of the copyrights in the victims, so that they could use the 
notice and takedown provisions of the DMCA to try to reign in the online 
distribution of works of revenge pornography.”26 Various plaintiffs who have 
been victims of NCP have adopted as a litigation strategy the notice and 
takedown approach Bartow suggests.27 When photos taken are by the victims 
themselves (so-called “selfies”), the photographer then indubitably hold 
copyright to the content. These plaintiffs can then wield the tools provided 
by the DMCA to ask ISPs to take down content.28 
 
 23.  See, e.g., Levendowski, supra note 8, at 438–39 (“From a First Amendment perspective, 
targeted revenge porn legislation occupies a tricky space: imprecisely drafted revenge porn legislation 
protects many victims but risks criminalizing protected expression, but whittling down legislation to 
avoid trammeling free speech excludes many of the victims the law intended to protect. Although broad 
legislation makes it easier to prosecute revenge porn uploaders and traffickers, it could also have 
unintended consequences on protected speech by criminalizing distributions made in the public interest, 
linking to revenge porn websites for purposes of critique, or disclosures made to document the harassment 
itself.”). 
 24.  Layla Goldnick, Coddling the Internet: How the CDA Exacerbates the Proliferation of Revenge 
Porn and Prevents a Meaningful Remedy for Its Victims, 21 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 583, 626 (2015); 
see also Levendowski, supra note 8, at 428 (“Although Section 230 broadly protects websites from 
liability, it does not give ISPs carte blanche to allow any and all content without concern for liability. 
ISPs are not required to monitor or proactively remove user-generated content, but Section 230 immunity 
does not extend to violations of child pornography, obscenity, or copyright laws. Similarly, Section 230 
immunity does not apply if the ISP is also an “information content provider.” Immunity does not extend 
to original information or content that an ISP creates or develops.”). 
 25.  Poole, supra note 12, at 181. 
 26.  Bartow, supra note 11, at 45–46 (2012). 
 27.  Goldstein, supra note 16; Amanda Levendowski, Our Best Weapon Against Revenge Porn: 
Copyright Law?, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 4, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/02/our-best-weapon-against-revenge-porn-
copyright-law/283564/. 
 28.  Poole, supra note 12, at 203 (“Copyright law is clearly a possibility for some NCP victims. 
Indeed, a survey of 864 victims indicates that 80% of NCP images are “self-shots,” meaning the subject 
is the author and thus copyright holder. This large percentage suggests that copyright law is a viable 
option for many victims”). 
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Much of this “content” is arguably unpublished work, as it was created 
for the purposes of sharing between intimate partners and not intended for 
public distribution. This is an important point to which I return below. In the 
context of unpublished works, Amanda Levendowski correctly states that: 
Section 104 of the Copyright Act grants the authors of unpublished and 
published works the same rights and protections. Limited distribution of a 
copyrighted work—to a prospective publisher or a love interest—has no 
effect on the exclusive rights granted to an author. The author of an 
unpublished work retains the exclusive right to decide whether to publish 
a work, and exercise or authorize any reproduction or display of the 
copyrighted work.29 
Moreover, as she also observes: 
[V]ictims do not need to register their copyrights or hire a lawyer to file a 
takedown notice. Victims need only submit their name and signature; 
identify the image; and provide links to the infringing material, contact 
information and written verification that they believes the use is 
unauthorized. . . Victims can also issue de-indexing requests to search 
engines, like Google or Yahoo, to remove infringing links from search 
results.30 
These relatively powerful federal remedies, compared to piecemeal 
state privacy protections, are appealing to plaintiffs who are victims of NCP. 
Copyright is not a complete solution, as it would not cover NCP in which the 
victim is not the author or owner of the work, and/or some ISPs might choose 
not to take down a work even after notification.31 Furthermore, on the 
Internet, there is always the issue of mirror sites and ISPs beyond the 
jurisdiction of federal copyright enforcement power. Practically, however, 
copyright may be the only route for removing content from the Internet. And 
rather than seeking damages for harm, the goal of many NCP victims is 
removing these harmful images.32 
 
 29.  Levendowski, supra note 8, at 440–41. 
 30.  Id. at 443; see also Poole, supra note 12, at 203 (“Section 230 does not immunize websites and 
service providers from copyright infringement claims. Rather, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) provides a safe harbor for websites that remove infringing items upon learning that their 
websites are hosting infringing materials. Once the provider receives a complaint from the author, the 
website is obligated to remove the photo or face liability as a secondary infringer.”). 
 31.  Poole, supra note 12, at 203 (“Unfortunately, copyright law does not protect victims in 
scenarios where they do not take the pictures themselves.”). David A. Bateman, a lawyer with the Cyber 
Civil Rights Legal Project, describes three different buckets into which NCP can fall: (1) selfies; (2) 
together filming jointly; and (3) a recorded video chat. Interview with David A. Bateman, Partner, K&L 
Gates (Feb. 26, 2016) (on file with author). He also described the difficulty that NCP victims face in 
finding adequate representation, in part because relatively few lawyers understand copyright notice and 
takedown and partly because many of the cases require cyberforensics expertise. Id. 
 32.  Goldstein, supra note 16 (quoting Mary Ann Franks, Miami Law professor). Last year, 
California Attorney General Kamala Harris launched a Cyber Exploitation Working Group, together with 
a resource hub, to assist NCP victims in seeking legal redress. Press Release, Attorney General Kamala 
D. Harris, Tech Leaders and Advocates Launch Offensive in Fight Against Cyber Exploitation (Oct. 14, 
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This present use of copyright law to address NCP squarely raises the 
question of whether it a distortion of copyright or whether this a natural 
evolution of copyright’s underlying policies in response to the sweeping 
scale of digital networks. Yet addressing privacy harms is well within the 
accepted historical, and therefore current, functions of copyright, particularly 
regarding unpublished works. And the use of copyright as one tool (among 
others) in knowledge governance and policymaking is essential in ubiquitous 
digital networks. 
Much of the content comprising NCP is unpublished, as it is intended 
for distribution between parties within the context of private relationships. 
The 1909 Copyright Act predicated statutory protection upon publication, 
and thus, copyright under this act historically turned on a key distinction 
between published and unpublished works. While the 1976 Act abolished 
publication as a pre-requisite for copyrightability,33 the current statutory 
framework retains more than a pentimento of the earlier common law and 
statutory approaches towards unpublished works.34 While scholars such as 
Jake Linford generally advocate a market-based approach to the right of first 
publication (especially the fair use doctrine), courts have “treated the right 
of first publication as analogous to chattel property rights in unpublished 
manuscripts.” Linford notes the influential effect of the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in White v. Kimmel,35 which articulated the difference between 
limited and general publication: 
At first glance, there appears to be a hierarchy of dissemination in the first 
publication cases. Sending a letter to one person, or entrusting a copy of 
your manuscript to someone with whom you have privity of contract, is 
 
2015), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-tech-leaders-and-
advocates-launch-offensive. 
 33.  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. The Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985) (“Among 
its other innovations, it eliminated publication ‘as a dividing line between common law and statutory 
protection,’ extending statutory protection to all works from the time of their creation. It also recognized 
for the first time a distinct statutory right of first publication, which had previously been an element of 
the common-law protections afforded unpublished works. The Report of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary confirms that ‘Clause (3) of section 106, establishes the exclusive right of publications. . . . 
Under this provision the copyright owner would have the right to control the first public distribution of 
an authorized copy . . . of his work.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 34.  Jake Linford, A Second Look at the Right of First Publication. 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 
585, 605 (2011) (“Wheaton also produced marginal notes and a syllabus, for which statutory protection 
could be secured. The court did not hesitate to recognize Wheaton’s right of first publication as a property 
right in the manuscript. The majority concluded, however, that once the work was published, it could 
only be protected by the statutory grant, and to secure statutory protection, the owner must observe all 
the requisite formalities. From Wheaton’s ruling on formalities, one can trace the development of the 
right of first publication prior to its incorporation in the Copyright Act of 1976. Under the 1909 Copyright 
Act, books and similar printed works qualified for statutory protection if they were published with the 
proper notice.”). 
 35.  White v. Kimmel, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1952). 
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not sufficient to amount to publication at law of a copyrighted work, but 
disseminating it in a newspaper amounts to such a publication.36 
And as he further observes, “A privacy rationale purportedly drove the Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion in White. The court in White referred to ‘private . . . 
publication’ as synonymous with ‘limited publication’ . . ..”37 
Furthermore, in Harper & Row, the U.S. Supreme Court grappled 
squarely with the potential conflict between the First Amendment and 
copyright in unpublished works by a public figure. The Court’s majority 
clearly expresses that privacy concerns are not only historically compatible 
with copyright, but also embedded within the current copyright statutory 
framework. In the course of deciding against fair use of excerpts of a work 
written by a public figure (former President Gerald Ford), the Court 
acknowledged that 
common-law copyright was often enlisted in the service of personal 
privacy. In its commercial guise, however, an author’s right to choose 
when he will publish is no less deserving of protection. . . . 38 
Harper & Row primarily addresses commercial harm and injury,39 but 
the words “no less deserving of protection” suggest strongly that non-
commercial harms are equally legitimate to the commercial harm at issue in 
that case. Moreover, an equitable current runs through the majority’s opinion 
in Harper and Row, which disapproves twice of the “purloined” aspect of 
 
 36.  Linford, supra note 34, at 610 (“Courts have generally followed the Ninth Circuit’s articulation, 
in White v. Kimmel, of the difference between limited and general publication. There, the court articulated 
three elements of a limited publication: the publication must ‘communicate[] the contents of a [work] to 
a definitely selected group and for a limited purpose, and without the right of further diffusion, 
reproduction, distribution or sale.’”) One question beyond the scope of this response but highly relevant 
to NCP is how the Kimmel taxonomy would be applied to text photos between two intimate partners, or 
to personal e-mail messages. 
 37.  Id. at 618–19. 
 38.  Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 554 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). Despite Justice 
O’Connor’s invocation of the seminal Warren and Brandeis article on privacy, Linford notes “[r]ecent 
[scholarship that] suggests that the English privacy law tradition of recognizing confidentiality based on 
expectations of trust in relationships—instead of the Warren and Brandeis concept of privacy based on 
an individual’s “inviolate personality”—may stem in part from these publication cases. Linford, supra 
note 34, at n.81 600; see Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path, 96 GEO. L. J. 123, 
136 (2007). 
 39.  Regarding commercial exploitation, Justice O’Connor wrote further in the context of a fair use 
analysis: 
The right of first publication implicates a threshold decision by the author whether and in 
what form to release his work. First publication is inherently different from other § 106 
rights in that only one person can be the first publisher; as the contract with Time 
illustrates, the commercial value of the right lies primarily in exclusivity. Because the 
potential damage to the author from judicially enforced “sharing” of the first publication 
right with unauthorized users of his manuscript is substantial, the balance of equities in 
evaluating such a claim of fair use inevitably shifts. 
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 553. 
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the manuscript—a pejorative characterization of the defendant journal’s acts 
that were vigorously disputed by the dissenting Justices.40 Importantly, the 
Court directly refers to, and indirectly approves, non-commercial rationales 
for exercising copyright control over private manuscripts, both historically 
and currently. As Justice O’Connor clarifies, 
Perhaps because the fair use doctrine was predicated on the author’s 
implied consent to “reasonable and customary” use when he released his 
work for public consumption, fair use traditionally was not recognized as 
a defense to charges of copying from an author’s as yet unpublished 
works. Under common-law copyright, ‘the property of the author . . . in 
his intellectual creation [was] absolute until he voluntarily part[ed] with 
the same.’41 
As the Harper and Row Court further states, “freedom of thought and 
expression “includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain 
from speaking at all.” . . . Courts and commentators have recognized that 
copyright, and the right of first publication in particular, serve this 
countervailing First Amendment value.”42 Moreover, in the Court’s earlier 
Stewart v. Abend decision, the Court (again through Justice O’Connor) 
emphatically stated that “nothing in the copyright statutes would prevent an 
author from hoarding all of his works during the term of the copyright. In 
fact, this Court has held that a copyright owner has the capacity arbitrarily to 
refuse to license one who seeks to exploit the work.”43 
The conclusion from both historical and current case law is that 
copyright’s commercial purpose is absolutely consistent with functions such 
as privacy protection, and can survive First Amendment scrutiny. 
Admittedly, this does not answer a different question: the use of copyright 
to further unsavory or socially harmful purposes such as suppressing 
criticism.44 Professor Fromer and others have rightly criticized the use of 
copyright by religious organizations to suppress dissent, or by heirs to ward 
off negative commentary on a famous deceased relative.45 
The answer, at least for purposes of this response, lies in the fairly 
specific context of NCP. Under closer scrutiny, the analogy between the 
privacy interests of the NCP victim and of those who might suppress valid 
dissent does not hold up. NCP is different from the other scenarios that Judge 
 
 40.  Id. at 542, 563, 592–93. 
 41.  Id. at 551. 
 42.  Id. at 559–60. 
 43.  Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228–29 (1990). 
 44.  McKeown, supra note 3 (describing the former dean of Liberty University who tried to use 
copyright to take down videos that criticized him for making misrepresentations). 
 45.  Fromer, supra note 2, at 563–64. 
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McKeown and Fromer rightly criticize, because of the pre-existing 
confidential, and indeed intimate, sexual relationship between two partners, 
and the desire of one of those partners to keep the work private pursuant to 
their original agreement.46 As the legislative history to Washington state 
House Bill 2160, which codified the tort of distributing intimate images, 
reminds us: 
The tort of invasion of privacy is based on the common law tort of public 
disclosure of private facts. Invasion of privacy occurs when a person gives 
publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another. A person who 
invades another’s privacy is subject to liability to the other person if the 
matter publicized is of a kind that would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person and is not of legitimate concern to the public.47 
To the extent that a work is intended for commercial markets, courts 
have traditionally respected the right of the author to control when and if the 
first publication occurs; the Harper & Row Court approved of the author’s 
“creative control” in that regard.48 In the context of non-commercial content 
production of NCP, courts can perform an analogous inquiry into the 
copyright interest of the author, as well as any fair use defense. Factors could 
include the creative origins of the work, the intent of the parties regarding 
public access (or publication), the creative and other control justifications of 
the author, the non-market harms to the author by allowing the defendant to 
publish the work, as well as the social benefits and harms of allowing the 
work to remain unpublished. If the social benefit of allowing publication is 
large, that benefit could be weighed against the copyright interest of the 
author, as part of the “breathing space”49 provided by the fair use doctrine. 
Commercial authors, such as J.D. Salinger, have exerted privacy interests via 
copyright and in response, courts have tried their best to accommodate the 
competing individual authorial concerns with compelling arguments 
regarding the need for public access and breathing room for follow-on 
creativity.50 
 
 46.  Although it is beyond the scope of this response to address joint works or works in which the 
victim is arguably not the author, I suggest that the question of ownership of these works and any implied 
license should take into account the circumstances in which they are made. The author of photographs 
and videos is not simply the person who pushes the “record” button. 
 47.  WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.795 (2015) (concerning the distribution of intimate images, effective 
as of Sept. 26, 2015). 
 48.  471 U.S. 539, 554 (1985) (“The author’s control of first public distribution implicates not only 
his personal interest in creative control but his property interest in exploitation of prepublication rights, 
which are valuable in themselves and serve as a valuable adjunct to publicity and marketing.”). 
 49.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 50.  Kate O’Neill, The Content of Their Characters: J.D. Salinger, Holden Caulfield, Fredrik 
Colting, 59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 291 (2012). 
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NCP is also different in most cases involving other functions of 
copyright, because neither party is a public figure nor is the content 
newsworthy in the classic First Amendment sense. From a First Amendment 
perspective, the same malfeasance (breach of confidential relationship) that 
may point in the direction of authorial control also provides a rationale for 
take-downs that do not conflict with the First Amendment. Geoffrey Stone 
has observed that the concept of “non-newsworthiness is staggeringly 
problematic”51 in the context of the Internet, and admonishes that “[t]he most 
realistic way to protect privacy today is at its source. B[ut b]y prohibiting 
highly intrusive methods of gaining information that people want to keep 
confidential, it is still possible to enable individuals who truly care about 
their privacy to preserve it.”52 By paying attention to the crucial context in 
which copyrighted content is acquired, including breach of a confidential 
relationship, copyright law can incorporate serious privacy concerns while 
at the same time not trampling upon free expression. Moreover, the Harper 
& Row Court declined to “expand[] the doctrine of fair use to create what 
amounts to a public figure exception to copyright.”53 
It is important too to deconstruct the “litigation cottage industry” 
around other functions of copyright. The number of trials in federal court has 
largely fallen, except for intellectual property cases.54 The increase in 
copyright litigation over the past twenty years is due largely to two recent 
phenomena: RIAA’s “John Doe” lawsuits beginning in 2004 and the 
growing number of lawsuits brought by pornographers against consumers 
who download content without payment.55 Copyright recognizes specific 
categories of harm as a matter of course (the commercial value of popular 
musical works and sound recordings or of pornographic audiovisual works), 
while it has been slow to recognize others (the privacy, reputations and safety 
of NCP plaintiffs). This asymmetry in the law’s recognition of harm by itself 
should give us pause. Copyright’s other function to further Internet privacy 
is a response to this systematic valorization (and conversely devaluing) of 
certain legal and social categories. The assumptions that “progress” can only 
 
 51.  Geoffrey R. Stone, PRIVACY, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND THE INTERNET, in THE OFFENSIVE 
INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND REPUTATION 174, 192 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum, eds. 
2010). 
 52.  Id. at 194. 
 53.  Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560. 
 54.  Team 6, The Vanishing Civil Trial, IP INN OF COURT (Oct. 3–4, 2015), 
http://www.docfoc.com/the-vanishing-civil-trial-team-6-2-a-panel-discussion-with-hon-john-c-
coughen. 
 55.  Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: 1994 TO 2014, 101 IOWA L. REV. 
110 (2015). 
1 CHON - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/16  9:36 AM 
2016] COPYRIGHT’S OTHER FUNCTIONS 377 
be expressed through the smooth functioning of market mechanisms 
reinforces, and even magnifies, the structured nature of economic, gender 
and other forms of inequality. Intellectual property, as I have argued 
elsewhere, operates within a larger frame of human flourishing.56 
Copyright law’s response to the issue of cyber harassment can be part 
of an overall legal response to a very real public health and public policy 
problem. In conjunction with public agencies such as the FTC, state 
attorneys general and the U.S. Attorney General, lawyers acting as private 
attorneys general can connect copyright to a larger social response, which 
some have started to call cyber civil rights.57 Because of the sensitivity of 
free expression values, cyber civil rights activists engage in what Frank 
Pasquale has called “tailored regulatory responses”58 to the problem of 
Internet hate speech. As he points out, “[c]opyright and trademark law are 
two instances where the unfettered right to free speech yields to larger social 
[concerns]”59 couched largely, but not exclusively, within the realm of 
business torts, and encompassing other functions of copyright as well. 
DMCA notice and take down provisions are as apropos in the context of NCP 
as they are in the context of other allegedly infringed content. As such, 
copyright law serves as one mechanism in a broader governance approach to 
knowledge circulating within digital networks. 
CONCLUSION: COPYRIGHT AND KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE 
The case study of NCP shows that context matters in the overall policy 
balance between copyright’s other functions and the free expression. As 
argued here, the privacy concerns expressed by plaintiffs in NCP cases can 
be accommodated with little distortion, either to copyright first principles, or 
to First Amendment concerns. Indeed, it will be interesting to see how 
 
 56.  Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2813, 
2813–2904 (2006); Margaret Chon, Copyright and Capability for Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803 
(2007); see also Elizabeth Rosenblatt & Rebecca Tushnet, TRANSFORMATIVE WORKS: YOUNG WOMEN’S 
VOICES ON FANDOM AND FAIR USE, EGIRLS, ECITIZENS, 385 (Jane Bailey & Valerie Steeves eds., 2015). 
 57.  See CITRON, supra note 21, at 24–26; see also Elisa D’Amico & Luke Steinberger, Fighting 
for Online Privacy with Digital Weaponry: Combating Revenge Pornography, in The First Annual Tyler 
Clementi Internet Safety Conference, 26 NYSBA ENTM’T, ARTS & SPORTS L.J. 24, 
http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/9f340f2d-82f5-43ff-855e-
7d1e0ebfaf92/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/52228d43-b9f5-4683-bb09-
805363c0578c/Fighting_for_Online_Privacy_with_Digital_Weaponry_Combating_Revenge_Pornogra
phy.pdf. 
 58.  FRANK PASQUALE, Reputation Regulation: Disclosure and the Challenge of Clandestinely 
Commensurating Computing, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND REPUTATION 107, 
122 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010). 
 59.  Id. at 122–23 (internal quotations omitted). 
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copyright doctrine continues to develop in response to the growing number 
of disputes triggered by salacious and unruly digital content, rather than 
maintaining a singularity of purpose as an engine of commerce. These 
digitally-based challenges may even give copyright a much-needed second 
act in an era where artificial scarcity of knowledge is no longer the given 
baseline.60 
This approach of incorporating copyright’s other functions into the 
mainstream of copyright instrumentalism also reflects a critical and 
structural inquiry into copyright’s larger goal of “progress of science.” Cyber 
harassment of all kinds, including NCP, has reached epidemic proportions 
and affects multiple vulnerable populations. The largely, although not 
entirely, gendered nature of the harms of NCP, which disproportionately 
affects women as victims, must be acknowledged.61 To do otherwise would 
result in the adoption of a formalist approach to copyright that isolates its 
instrumental purpose to the singularity of promoting commercial activity 
without regard to its role in generating many other social benefits and costs. 
 
 
 60.  See Mark Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 460 (2015); Pamela 
Samuelson & Members of the CPP, The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175 (2010). 
 61.  See Martha C. Nussbaum, OBJECTIFICATION AND INTERNET MISOGYNY, THE OFFENSIVE 
INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND REPUTATION 68–87 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 
2010); CITRON, supra note 21, at 96–101. In the words of a recent NCP victim whose experiences and 
advocacy led to the 2015 enactment of the Washington state criminal provision, WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 9A.86.010, a typical response is to “blame the victim, that [she] shouldn’t have these kinds of things on 
[her] computer. But we don’t have that reaction when people store financial and other kinds of highly 
personal information on their computers.” Telephone Interview with K.L. (Feb. 21, 2016) (unpublished 
notes on file with author). 
